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stitute a waiver. It then weighed the public and private interests to arrive
at the result that Smith had not forfeited his right to attack his Virginia
conviction by becoming a fugitive from justice.
The court considered that its decision might result in an increased flow
of habeas corpus petitions (which was one thing that the 1948 revision
sought to cut down) ; that the decision certainly would not deter escapes
from prison; and that it would be desirable that Smith's conviction be reviewed by a Virginia court or a federal court sitting in Virginia, which
would have a familiarity with the customs and practices in Virginia, enabling it better to evaluate the testimony and records. Against these considerations stood the prospects that, if the court denied the petitioner's writ and
if Smith's allegations were true-a thing which could only be determined by
a hearing on the merits-an innocent man convicted of crime in violation of
substantial constitutional rights would unjustly suffer the severer penalties
meted out in New York to second offenders. Further a state court's laxity
in the protection of constitutional rightg would be sanctioned."
It would seem harsh and unjust under circumstances like those of this
case to apply a mechanical and inflexible rule so as to deny at least a hearing on the merits. The federal district court may always deny relief after
the facts are considered.
But, would the decision in the case have been different if a few, half,
or most of the factors which the court considered in entertaining the petition had not been present? How substantial must be the constitutional
right which is claimed? Where is the dividing line past which a petitioner's
prior conduct will estop him from claiming that he has been denied a constitutional rights? These questions, and others, remain to be answered.

JOHN F. BLACKWOOD

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAWAPPEAL BY INDIENTS.-Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in Illinois. Immediately upon conviction they filed a motion in the trial court
asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic
transcript of the proceedings, be furnished them without cost, alleging that
they were "poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to
acquire the Transcript and Court Records needed to prosecute an appeal. . .

."

Under Illinois law it is necessary for a defendant to furnish a bill

of exceptions or a report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial
judge in order to get an appellate review.' These are often impossible to prepare without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings, and counsel
for Illinois did not deny that one was needed by petitioners. Indigent defendants sentenced to death are afforded a free transcript, but the others
must pay for their own.' Upon denial of their motion by the trial court, the
petitioners filed under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,' which pro'United States e.r rel. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1956).
'ILL. REv. STAT., C. 110, § 101.65 (Supreme Court Rule 65) (1955).
'ILL. REv. STAT., c. 38, § 769a (1955).
8ILL. Rsv. STAT., c. 38, §§ 826-32 (1955).
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vides that an indigent may obtain a free transcript under certain circumstances, if Illinois oi7 federal constitutional questions are raised.' The petitioners alleged that there were nonconstitutional errors in the trial which
twould entitle them to have their convictions set aside on appeal, that the
only impediment to full appellate review was their lack of funds to buy a
transcript and that such refusal to afford appellate review solely because of
poverty was a denial of federal due process and equal protection. This petition was also denied. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal
solely on the ground that the charges raised no substantial constitutional
questions. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, judgment vacated and remanded. A state that conditions appellate review in
such a way as to discriminate against some convicted defendants on account
of their poverty violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (Justice
Frankfurter, concurring separately; Justices Burton and Minton, joined by
Justices Reed and Harlan, dissenting; Justice Harlan, dissenting separately).
This decision comes as a logical step in the "unfolding content" of due
process and equal protection, which are living concepts constantly changing
to conform to current social requirements.' The concessions of the Magna
Charta were a strong early step toward providing equal justice for all.! Another major step was the fifth amendment with its due process of law clause
and the sixth amendment with its provision granting an accused the right
to counsel in the federal courts. Then came the fourteenth amendment, the
basis of this decision, -which was at first intended solely for the benefit of
the Negro race, granting them equal rights with other citizens.7 It soon
came to have a much broader application. In Powell v. Alabama the right
of the accused to have counsel was found to apply in some cases to proceedings in state courts. In 1955, a United States District Court dismissed an
indictment for filing false and fraudulent income tax returns on the ground
that the defendant was deprived of effective counsel when his assets were
impounded by the Government leaving him unable to hire an accountant
in a case where refutation of the Government's claim would have required
the assistance of an accountant.'
LL. REv. STAT., C.37, § 163f (1955), provides in effect that, if in the opinion of the
trial judge the post-conviction petition is sufficient to require an answer, a free
transcript may be provided.
'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) : "Representing as it does a living principle,
due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given
time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights."
'Sections 39, 40. "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or
justice. ... No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or
exiled, or anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him or send upon him, but by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."
7
Slaughter-house Cases, 8 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) : "It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other."
8287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) : ". . . in a capital case where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense . . . it is the
duty of the court whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law ..
"
'United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
4
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Despite the expanding concepts of due process and equal protection, the
instant decision undoubtedly came as a surprise in jurisdictions which have
held, as Minnesota has, that "the U.S. Constitution does not require a state
to provide the expenses of an appeal for an indigent defendant in a criminal
case, and the constitution and the statutes of this state neither compel nor
authorize such procedure.'"' With respect to even further broadening of the
scope of due process and equal protection, the fourteenth amendment has
been suggested as a means to require the states to provide legal aid to the
impoverished in civil cases."
The majority opinion states that in criminal trials a state may not discriminate on account of poverty any more than on account of religion or
color. It applies this principle to prevent the states from making the lack
of means of one convicted of a crime a bar to an appellate review, when he
is in other respects entitled to one. The Court did not prescribe the manner
in which such "invidious discriminations" should be remedied, but left the
method to be used to the states.' It should be noted that the Court did not
say that a state must grant appellate review, but that if it does it must not
discriminate against anyone because of his poverty.
The dissenting opinion of Justices Burton and Minton argues that a
state "is not bound to make the defendants economically equal before its
bar of justice." This may be true, but even they admit that it is a desirable social policy, and the Court, by extending the broad provisions of the
Constitution to apply to this situation, took another step toward giving all
people, regardless of financial standing, an equal chance for justice. It is
not too great a step from granting an accused the right to counsel where
it is considered unfair to require him to defend himself to the granting of
appellate review to those hitherto prevented from having one only by the
price tag. '
The majority opinion applies both the equal protection and the due
process clauses without articulating its reasons. Justice Harlan, in his
separate dissenting opinion, says that it is not an equal protection question
at all, but rather a due process question. He argues that Illinois has made
no "classification" imposing legal disabilities as is contemplated by the
equal protection clause, but rather that the decision is based on the state's
failure to remove the natural disability of being poor. He reasons that if
the court can find an" invidious classification" between "rich" and" poor"
with respect to requiring a person convicted of a felony to purchase a transcript before he can appeal, one must also conclude that requiring tuition
fees to attend a state university is an "invidious classification." Therefore,
he argues, the real basis of the majority opinion is that "it violated 'fundamental fairness' for a state which provides for appellate review, and thus

"State ex rel. Koalska v. Rigg, 74 N.W.2d 661, 662 (Minn. 1956) ; State v. Lorenz,

235 Minn. 221, 50 N.W.2d 270, 271 (1951).
uNote, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 67 (1956).
"Illinois might supply -transcripts under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act because of
the United States Supreme Court's holding that constitutional rights were violated.
Or it may find that "bystander's bills of exceptions or other methods of reporting
trial proceedings" could be used. Or the legislature could enact a statute authorizing the trial judge to grant a free transcript to indigents convicted of any crime.
"A law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in operation.
Guinn v, United States, 238 U.S, 347 (1915).
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apparently considers such review necessary to assure justice, not to see to
it that such appeals are in fact available to those it would imprison for serious crimes."
What the Court has done is to extend equal protection, in a situation
where social considerations demand it, to include the classification of people
which inevitably results from economic inequality. There is a fundamental
difference between entering a state university and appealing a criminal conviction. The former is purely a privilege, while the latter has for all practical purposes become a right.
Justice Harlan further says that Illinois did not violate the due process
clause, which guarantees the right not to be denied an appeal for arbitrary
or capricious reasons, because no such arbitrariness exists in the Illinois appellate system, since the failure to give free transcripts is based upon a real,
if unenlightened, economic reason. But even if it is considered a due process question, can it not be that our social standards have advanced to the
point where the denial of an appeal in these circumstances would be a
"denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice ?' "
The effect of the decision has already been felt in at least two states
other than Illinois. In New York, where a statute provides that a poor person may appeal without paying fees, except that a court order is required
to obtain the stenographic minutes, a county court's ruling had stood since
1943 that only where a judgment is for death or for life imprisonment does
the court have the power to furnish, free, a transcript of the minutes pursuant to the statute. In June, 1956, a defendant convicted of burglary in
the third degree, who filed a request for a copy of the stenographic minutes
of the trial for the purpose of further review of his case, was furnished a
copy of the record without cost.' The court based its decision squarely on
the principal case.
In another recent case a prisoner appealed to the Oregon Supreme
Court from a dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the judgment under which he was convicted was void.' Oregon law requires a bond
to be posted for the amount of appellate costs before an appeal can be perfected." The court allowed the appeal, waiving the requirement of the bond,
saying that the United States Supreme Court, having decided as it did in
the principal case, would surely "hold that a pauper ... would be entitled
'Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
"People v. Jackson, 152 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1956) ; N. Y. PEN. LAW, § 1045a; N. Y. CODE
CRIM. Ppoc. §§ 308, 485.

"Barber v. Gladden, 298 P.2d 986 (Ore. 1956).
1OM REV. STAT., §§ 19.030(4), 19.040 (1955). At the present time the federal courts
(58 STAT. 5 (1921), 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(f), 1915(a) (1952)) and 29 states provide
free transcripts of right to indigents convicted of noncapital crimes. Besides the
29, at least five states have given the trial courts discretionary power to order free
transcripts in noncapital cases, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court has reached
a similar result by interpretation of statute. There is some indication of a similar
result in Connecticut. Instant case at 33 . 4. Montana has a statute providing
that i "If it appears to the judge that a defendant in a criminal case is unable to
pay for (a copy of the record), the same shall be furnished him and paid for by the
county." REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-1904.
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. . to the waiver of the requirement of a bond for costs if such waiver is
necessary to the presentation of his appeal."'
This decision will have the general effect of tending to eliminate any
*

instances where a defendant convicted of a crime is prevented from appealing to the appellate court of his state solely on the ground that he is not
financially able to purchase a transcript of the trial record, put up security
for an appellate bond, or pass any other finaneial burdle erected by the

laws of his state. This result is desirable" and the case will undoubtedly
hasten the time when all of the states will have a simple, efficient system of
allowing an indigent full appellate review of his conviction in a criminal
court, where there is merit in his appeal.'
If the Court really meant that
this was an equal protection question, as well as a due process question, both
concepts of constitutional guarantees were extended into the new area of
economic inequality, where the possibilities of application are virtually unlimited.
GEORGE DALTHORP

CORPORATIONS-CUMULATIVE

VOTING-STAGGERED ELECTIONS AND CLAS-

SIFICATION OF DIRECTORS--Louis Wolfson, a minority owner of common stock

of Montgomery Ward and Co., and in the midst of a proxy fight with the
management for the control of the board of directors, had protested to the
defendant, Sewell Avery, that the by-law of Montgomery Ward which
authorized the election of only one-third of the company's nine directors
each year was illegal. Subsequently he brought action seeking a declaratory
judgment to the effect that a provision of the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing the right to vote cumulatively in the election of corporate directors

was violated by the Illinois Business Corporation Act, section 35,' and the

"The

court is probably right. "Surely no one would contend that either a state or
the Federal Government could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to
pay court costs in advance should be denied the right... to defend themselves in
court.... There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies
the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to
pay the costs in advance." Instant case at 17.
"The following are possible objections to the decision: (1) The decision is an example of federal meddling in state affairs. But the states are not free to deprive their
citizens of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. (2) It will impose great
expense on the states. Since a majority of the states do make provisions for furnishing indigents with transcripts, the others should be able to, also. In addition
there may be other ways in which a state may allow an indigent to appeal which
are less expensive. (3) It may result in the states' limiting the right to appeal.
This seems unlikely since society has come to consider appeals as essentially a right.
(4) Prisoners now in confinement will ask for free transcripts so they may appeal
also. Practically forbids the states' allowing this. One rationalization is that the
prisoners waived their right to a free transcript by not making a timely request.
Perhaps a more realistic one is that the decision is effective only for the future and
is not retroactive, being in fact a new rule rathef than a discovery of what has always been the law.
'The majority opinion states that the petitioners had alleged that there were errors
in the trial which entitled them to have their convictions set aside on appeal and
that these allegations were not denied. Therefore, it was assumed that there was
merit in the appeal in the instant case. It is a teasonable conclusion that this decision may apply only where there is apparently merit in an appeal.
'ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.

'ILT- ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.35 (1954).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1956

5

